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I. INTRODUCTION 
Patents. Copyright. When it comes to intellectual property in Europe, these 
two terms are, largely, the name of the game.1 Whether a piece of intellectual 
property is classified as something that falls under copyright or as something that 
falls under patent will determine the scope of the intellectual property’s 
protection, the subject matter it extends to, the rules of engagement in litigation, 
and many other things.2 Do you want to protect a book or a song that you just 
wrote? Get yourself a copyright.3 Do you want to protect that new high-tech 
electric engine that you just developed? Get yourself a patent.4 Easy, right? 
Well, not so fast. Among the various clear-cut issues in intellectual property 
law lurks a murky foe: software.5 Software eludes easy classification, finding 
some protection in both of the major traditional regimes, regimes that were 
developed in a time where the notion of software—and the protections it might 
need—were beyond contemplation.6 Some prefer the resultant (but unintended) 
weakness, but to others, the lack of software protection and the resulting issue of 
 
1. Intellectual property falls into two major categories—industrial property, which includes patents, and 
copyright. However, to be perfectly clear, intellectual property has been used to describe other sorts of property 
too, such as trade secrets and trademarks. See What is Intellectual Property?, WIPO, http://www. 
wipo.int/about-ip/en/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). Notably, trade secrets and trademarks, while generally 
discussed as intellectual property, are actually creatures of economic regulation. For instance, in the United 
States, trademark protection derives from the commerce clause as opposed to the intellectual property clause. 
2. See The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (U.K.) (describing differences in subject matter 
between patents and copyright, as well as there scope); copyright extends to literary works (which includes 
“song lyrics, manuscripts, manuals, computer programs, commercial documents, leaflets, newsletters & articles, 
etc.”), dramatic works (which includes “plays, dances, etc.”), “musical recordings and scores”, artistic works 
(which includes “photography, painting, sculptures, architecture, technical drawings/diagrams, maps, logos”), 
“typographical arrangement of published editions” (which includes “magazines, periodicals, etc.”), sound 
recordings (which includes “recordings of other copyright works, e.g. musical and literary”), and films (which 
includes “broadcasts and cable programmes”). Fact Sheet P-01: UK Copyright Law, THE UK COPYRIGHT SERV. 
(Nov. 27, 2009), http://www.copyrightservice.co.uk/copyright/p01_uk_copyright_law; see also The Patents Act 
of 1977 (2011) (U.K.) (providing further guidelines on patent rights and rules); patent extends to new 
inventions, with “an inventive step that is not obvious to someone with knowledge and experience in the 
subject,” which is “capable of being made or used in some kind of industry,” and which is not “a scientific or 
mathematical discovery, theory or method; a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work; a way of performing a 
mental act, playing a game or doing business; the presentation of information, or some computer programs; an 
animal or plant variety; a method of medical treatment or diagnosis; [and which is not] against public policy or 
morality.” What Is A Patent?, INTELL. PROP. OFF., www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent/p-about/p-whatis.htm (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2011). 
3. What is Intellectual Property?, supra note 1 (explaining that copyright applies to literary works). 
4. The Patents Act of 1977, c. 1, § 1 (U.K.) (noting that patent rights can be granted to new inventions 
with industrial application). 
5. See Richard Stallman, Beware: Europe’s ‘Unitary Patent’ Could Mean Unlimited Software Patents, 
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/aug/22/european-
unitary-patent-software-warning (discussing current issues with software protection in the United Kingdom). 
6. AMY LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW 2-4 (2008) (providing a history of the development 
of patent law, and noting that it had begun development as far back as the fifteenth century); see also JULIE E. 
COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 21-23 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that, in its first 
form, copyright protection was first developed in England in the fifteenth century). 
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piracy is a signature (twentieth and) twenty-first century issue that needs a 
twenty-first century solution.7 To the chagrin of the former camp, a solution is 
likely on its way: the unitary software patent.8 A unitary software patent, part of a 
larger unitary patent for the European Union, will create a software patent that is 
enforceable in twenty-five European nations9 (and could, eventually, be valid in 
any EU country), including the United Kingdom, should they sign the treaty.10 It 
would greatly strengthen the protection of software available through patent.11 
However, some, including noted free software activist Richard Mathew Stallman, 
passionately oppose the use of any unitary patent.12 Stallman and his cohorts 
argue that conferring the power to grant unitary patents to the European Union 
could enable it to expand the scope of software that is currently subject to patent 
protection.13 This, they argue, would lead to inefficiency, stifle innovation, and 
the spark all out wars for software patent protection by the software industry.14 
This Comment seeks to address the fears espoused by Stallman and other 
anti-software patent forces. This Comment will do this by first offering a brief 
overview of the software protections available under current U.K. and EU law. 
Next, this Comment will introduce the concept of a unitary patent, and explain 
how software could become involved. After doing so, this Comment will 
evaluate the unitary patent, and ultimately argue that, due to protections currently 
embedded in the European Union’s patent law jurisprudence, the unitary patent 
does not pose a significant threat that the scope of software protection by patent 
would be expanded, and provides several advantages over the current, country-
by-country patenting system. Finally, this Comment, taking in account the 
software industry’s desire for increased software protection,15 will propose 
 
7. See Stallman, supra note 5 (providing a discussion of the current dispute over software protection by 
patent); Aerotel v. Telco & Macrossan’s Applications, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [16] (Eng.). 
8. Stallman, supra note 5. 
9. Notably missing from the unitary patent are Spain and Italy, who have declined to join. William New, 
Europe Reaches Agreement on Unitary Patent, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 29, 2012, 4:45 PM), www.ip-
watch.org/2012/06/29/europe-reaches-agreement-on-unitary-patent/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium= 
feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ip-watch+%28Intellectual+Property+Watch%29. 
10. Stallman, supra note 5. 
11. See Patents for Software, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/computers/ 
software.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (discussing the issues in the debate over software patent protection). 
12. Stallman, supra note 5. 
13. Id. 
14. See id.; IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
GROWTH 22 (2011), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf (noting that a stalled 
negotiation process could lead to a unitary patent that was ultimately burdensome; ultimately, however, 
Professor Hargreaves seems to indicate his support for the unitary patent). 
15. This Comment will now take a moment to note that software is a hotly debated issue—what is 
software piracy to some is free software and progress to others. Those terms ultimately form a venn diagram, 
with some things falling exclusively into the piracy section, others into free software, and much of it into an 
overlapping, hard to define gray zone. See Stallman, supra note 5. This Comment does not take a stance one 
way or another in proposing this new protection system. Instead, it recognizes that there is a desire for increased 
protection, and proposes a way to do it, with the hope that it can provide increased protection from piracy while 
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expanding software protection beyond its current state. It will do this by first 
discussing the means to enable such an expansion, and will then make a 
particular recommendation: a system that models portions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act. 
II. SOFTWARE PROTECTION TODAY 
This Part seeks to give the reader a background into how software is 
currently protected. Under current U.K. law, EU law, and the laws of several 
international treaty organizations, software is protected through a variety of 
mechanisms, including patent and copyright law.16 
A.  Software and Patents 
Available to the first inventor or entity who applies for it,17 a “patent may be 
granted only for an invention in respect of which the following conditions are 
satisfied, that is to say. . .the invention is new[,]. . .it involves an inventive 
step[,]. . .[and] it is capable of industrial application.”18 If and when a patent is 
granted, the patent holder earns the exclusive right to practice that patent, and is 
entitled to bring suits for infringement against any person or entity who practices 
the patent or a part of the patent without first getting the patent holder’s 
permission, even if that person or entity is not trying to make a profit.19 This 
patent holder retains this right of exclusion for twenty years from the date of 
filing their application.20 At that point, the work reverts to the public domain, and 
competitors may begin to practice the patent without fear of an infringement 
suit.21 
What about software patents? Historically, patent protections have been only 
hesitantly applied to software.22 Software has had this particular difficulty, in part 
because of the Patents Act’s section on excluded subject matter, which includes a 
 
not completely stifling software freedom, which is what would happen if an alternate system, like a more 
aggressive software patent, were used. Id.  
16. Another notable area of protection, one that will not be explored in this section, is licensing law. 
17. Patents: Some Facts, MEDIPEX, www.medipex.co.uk/data/files/Factsheets/Patents%20Factsheet.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
18. The Patents Act of 1977, c. 1, § 1 (U.K.). 
19. See A Short Guide: UK Patents, MARKS&CLERK UK, http://www.marks-clerk.com/uk/attorneys/ 
documents/UKPatentsAShortGuide09.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
20. Id.  
21. But see UK IPO Launches New Databases, MARKS&CLERK UK (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.marks-
clerk.com/uk/attorneys/news/newsitem.aspx?item=240. 
22. See Stallman, supra note 5 (providing a brief discussion of the battle over software patents); Aerotel 
v. Telco & Macrossan’s Applications, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [74] (Eng.) (“[T]he [United Kingdom’s 
Patent] Office has a strong tradition of rejecting patent applications for software.”). 
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provision against the patentability of computer programs.23 Nonetheless, “[m]any 
thousands of patents have been granted” in the realm of computer programs; it is 
allowable when the software or computer-related invention in question is of a 
“technical character” or solves a technical problem.”24 Patents granted in this 
arena include, but are not limited to: 
•  Software for controlling an apparatus or machinery. 
•  Software which processes data representing images or data 
representing other physical entities. 
•  Software which improves the operation of hardware, for example 
improved operating systems or software achieving an increase in 
effective memory or speed. 
•  Software for implementing business inventions where a “technical” 
problem is overcome in order to implement the invention and the 
invention directly solves the technical problem. 
•  Any other software where there are sufficient “technical” considerations 
involved in the production of the software, or which produces a new 
technical effect.25  
Two recent developments to software patents deserve attention. First, in 
2005, there was a push by pro-software patent forces to have the European 
Parliament extend patent protections to software.26 Opponents of the effort argued 
that it would severely limit software innovation by making software development 
a sort of maze in which patented ideas had to be avoided, limiting efficiency and 
variety.27 As a result of this strong opposition movement, the directive failed, and 
software patent protection remained as it was.28 
A second noteworthy development occurred in Aerotel v. Telco and 
Macrossan’s Applications, a 2006 case decided by the Court of Appeals of 
England and Wales.29 Considering European Patent Office policy and law, 
(specifically Article 52 of the European Patent Convention), the court rejected 
Macrossan’s application because it related to software and business methods, 
which are two excluded categories of subject matter under the Patents Act for the 
 
23. The Patents Act of 1977 § 2(c). 
24. A Short Guide: UK Patents, supra note 19. 
25. Id. 
26. See Richard Stallman, Patent Absurdity, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2005), http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/technology/2005/jun/23/onlinesupplement.insideit.  
27. Id.; Stallman, supra note 5. 
28. See Stallman, supra note 5 (providing a brief discussion of the battle over software patents). 
29. Aerotel v. Telco & Macrossan’s Applications, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [16] (Eng.). 
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United Kingdom and under the European Patent Convention.30 However, in doing 
so, the court did note that there was political pressure to extend the patent 
protections to software, finding that the current situation was not compatible with 
the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights.31 It further noted a growing market demand for 
change—that “[p]eople are applying for what are, or arguably are[,] . . . computer 
program patents in significant numbers.”32 
The case did not quite end here. Macrossan, unhappy with the decision, made 
an appeal to the House of Lords, seeking clarification on Article 52 and U.K. 
patent policy, and ultimately tried to extend the scope of patent protection to 
include software inventions such as his own.33 The House of Lords, however, 
“dismissed his appeal on the grounds that [Macrossan’s case did] not raise an 
arguable point of law of general public importance.”34 
To round out patent and software issues, this Comment now addresses what a 
“technical contribution” is. Required by both the European Patent Office and the 
(United Kingdom’s) Intellectual Property Office,35 technical contribution is a 
standard that is used to determine whether an invention involving software—a 
computer implemented invention—falls outside the aforementioned exclusion of 
software subject matter.36 While this concept is “at the heart of patent law,”37 
there is a divergence in how the requirement is interpreted by the United 
Kingdom and by the European Patent Office.38 
A recent and controlling discussion of the issue by the United Kingdom 
courts came in the aforementioned Aerotel v. Telco and Macrossan’s 
 
30. Id. at [1], [16], [57], [61], [67]-[74] (note, there was a separate appeal by Aerotel that was also 
considered, and which was granted; it is not the subject explored by this section). 
31. Id. at [16] (while the judge made this point, the formulation of his decision did not take notice of it 
because the agreement was not at issue). 
32. Id. at [17].  
33. See Lucy Sherriff, Software Developer Asks Lords to Hear Patent Appeal, THE REG. (Nov. 10, 2006, 
6:02 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/11/10/patent_appeal/. 
34. Ben Moshinsky, Macrossan’s Epic Patent Fight Ends, THE LAWYER (Feb. 7, 2007), 
http://www.thelawyer.com/macrossans-epic-patent-fight-ends/124165.article. 
35. Note, the office was formerly known as the U.K. Intellectual Property Office, and, before that, the 
Patent Office. Newport, South Wales, INTELL. PROP. OFF., http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/history/history-
office/history-office-newport.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012); Patents Act 1977: Patentability of Computer 
Programs, INTELL. PROP. OFF. http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-pn-computer.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
36. Aerotel, EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [11], [29]; Case T 0154/04, Duns Licensing Assoc., 2008/02 Official 
Journal of the EPO 46, 54 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-
appeals/recent/t040154ex1.html; Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 
U.N.T.S. 199. 
37. In the Matter of Application No. 9204959.2 By Fujitsu Limited, [1997] EWCA (Civ) 1174, [31] 
(Eng.). 
38. Case T, Official J. of the EPO at 70. Note that the United Kingdom interprets the standard for both 
its own national patent laws and the European Patent Convention, whereas latter considers only the European 
Patent Convention. See Aerotel, EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [33]; see also Case T, Official J. of the EPO at 58-59. 
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Applications.39 In that case, the court found the standard for the technical 
contribution requirement, as required by the European Patent Convention, to be 
encapsulated in a four-part test.40 Step one engages in basic claim construction.41 
Step two conducts an “assessment of the inventor’s contribution.”42 Step three 
considers whether the contribution consists of solely excluded matter.43 Step four 
“ask[s] whether there is anything technical about the contribution.”44 In 
announcing the test, Lord Justice Jacob noted that the test was a departure from 
the European Patent Office’s approach, which the court criticized as taking an 
overly narrow view of what an excludable computer program can be.45 The court 
reasoned that the European Patent Office’s view was a narrow one because it 
limited excludable computer programs only to programs that were wholly 
abstract and intangible.46 Lord Justice Jacob instead argued that “the framers of 
the . . . [European Patent Convention] really meant to exclude computer 
programs in practical and operable form. They meant to exclude real computer 
programs, not just an abstract series of instructions.”47 
Soon after the decision, the European Patent Office addressed the standard 
promulgated by Aerotel v. Telco and Macrossan’s Applications.48 In Duns 
Licensing Associates, a decision by the European Patent Office’s Technical 
Board of Appeal, the Board held that the approach authored by Lord Justice 
Jacob, in its focus on the issue of abstractness, was incorrectly “rooted in this 
second ordinary meaning of the term of invention,”49 a view based in old but no 
longer applicable law.50 The Board held that this was “not consistent with a good 
faith interpretation of the European Patent Convention.”51 Construing Lord 
Justice Jacob’s technical contribution test as “[presupposing] that ‘novel and 
inventive purely excluded matter does not count as a technical contribution,’52 the 
Board resoundingly found the approach to be simply ‘irreconcilable with the 
European Patent Convention.’”53 Despite this harsh criticism, however, the 
United Kingdom has nonetheless retained Lord Justice Jacob’s test, and, 
 
39. Aerotel, EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [11]. 
40. Id. at [63], [64], [72].  
41. Id. at [63].  
42. Id.  
43. Id. at [64].  
44. Id. at [72].  
45. Id. at [29]-[31].  
46. Id. 
47. Id. at [31]. 
48. Case T 0154/04, Duns Licensing Assoc., 2008/02 Official Journal of the EPO 46, 70 (Nov. 15, 
2006), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t040154ex1.html. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 71. 
53. Id. 
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ostensibly, the theory that it is rooted in, that some computer programs are 
excludable under the European Patent Convention.54 
B.  Software and Copyright55 
In addition to patent law, the United Kingdom provides protection to 
software through its copyright regime.56 Software is protected under copyright as 
if it was a literary work—a literary work whose text is the software’s source 
code.57 The software copyright’s duration is for the life of the author plus seventy 
years after the author has passed away;58 during this time, the copyright provides 
the author with numerous rights and protections.59 These rights and protections 
give the copyright owner the ability “to control the ways in which . . . [the 
copyrighted] material may be used . . . [and] cover[s] broadcast and public 
performance, copying, adapting issuing and lending copies to the public.60 In 
many cases, the creator will also have the right to be identified as the author and 
to object to distortions of his work.”61 Furthermore, under the fourth article of the 
European Union’s Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, the 
software copyright holder retains the right to restrict the right of reproduction of 
software, temporarily or permanently.62 Specifically, it states that “[i]nsofar as 
loading, displaying, running, transmission or storage of the computer program 
necessitate such reproduction, such acts shall be subject to authorization by the 
right holder.”63 The software owner may also restrict “the translation, adaptation, 
arrangement and any other alteration of a computer program and the reproduction 
of the results thereof, without prejudice to the rights of the person who alters the 
program.”64 Moreover, the software owner also maintains the distribution rights.65 
However, copyright does grant some rights to the user as well. For one, 
despite the provisions of the fourth article of the European Union’s Directive on 
 
54. Astron Clinica Ltd. & Others and The Comptroller Gen. of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, 
[2008] EWHC (Pat) 85, [44]-[46] (Eng.). 
55. Note, a unitary patent system would not affect copyright laws; however, as copyright is a key regime 
in governing software, and because my later proposal will analyze copyright elements, the topic warrants 
discussion now. 
56. If You Think Software Patents Are a Pain, Try Software Copyright, THE IP KAT (July 27, 2010), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2010/07/if-you-think-software-patents-are-pain.html. 
57. SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., [2010] EWHC (Civ) 1829, [197] (Eng.). 
58. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, c. 48, § 12(2) (U.K.). 
59. Id. at c. 16-27. 
60. Fact Sheet P-01: UK Copyright Law, supra note 2.  
61. Id. 
62. Directive 2009/24/EC, art. 4, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 2009 O.J. (L 111). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, software users retain the right to 
reproduce software for certain purposes, including the creation of “back-up”66 
copies, and where reproduction is necessary for the operation of the software.67 
Further, under article five, the owner of software can, without running afoul of 
article four, “observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to 
determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program if 
he does so while performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, 
transmitting or storing the program which he is entitled to do.”68 Additionally, 
software users are allowed to decompile software for the purpose of (and only of) 
achieving interoperability with other programs, so long as the information needed 
for interoperability is not readily available, nor are the results of interoperability 
studies used to create programs substantially similar to the software from which 
interoperability is sought.69 Finally, the author’s rights to control their software’s 
distribution are limited by the first sale doctrine; they have no right to control 
their product’s resale or rental once the initial purchase has already occurred.70 
Another important point of consideration is how software protection under 
copyright differs from software protection under patent. A copyright does not 
protect the entire scope of the software in question.71 Unlike copyrights, patents 
provide owners with the rights of exclusivity over an idea.72 Software copyrights, 
however, do not extend to the “ideas, procedures, methods of operation and 
mathematical concepts” that underlie a given piece of software.73 Instead, 
copyright protects software only to the extent and in the manner of which a piece 
of software expresses certain ideas and concepts.74 This is significant when it 
comes to matters of infringement since copyright infringement only occurs when 
there is direct copying of the copyrighted source code;75 if a new user can find a 
way to express that source code differently, they may be able to practice the idea 
underlying the software without facing liability.76 Having addressed software 
patent and copyright issues, we can now turn to the unitary patent. 
 
66. Id. at art. 5. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (discussing how rights to reproduce software for the purpose of operating the software can be 
contractually nullified and rights to create backup copies cannot). 
69. Id. at art. 6. 
70. Id. at art. 4. 
71. SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., [2010] EWHC (Civ) 1829, [206]-[207] (Eng.). 
72. Scott M. Alter, Selecting Protection for Computer Programs: Know Your Options, 39 FED. B. NEWS 
& J. 264 (1992). 
73. SAS Institute Inc., EWHC (Civ) 1829 at [205]; see also Navitaire Inc. v. Easyjet Airline Company 
Bulletproof Technologies Inc, [2004] EWHC (Civ) 1725, [87] (Eng.) (holding that copyright protection does 
not extend to programming language). 
74. SAS Institute Inc., EWHC (Civ) 1829 at [206]-[207].  
75. Alter, supra note 72. 
76. See SAS Institute Inc., EWHC (Civ) 1829 at [206]-[207]. 
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III. ENTER THE UNITARY (SOFTWARE) PATENT 
The unitary patent will create a new regime, which governs the creation and 
implementation of patent law in the majority of the European Union.77 Because of 
this, as Stallman suggests, it would become possible for patentability to be 
extended to cover issues of software.78 
A.  So, What Is a Unitary Patent? 
Assuming nothing derails the ratification process, unitary patents will, in 
many ways, be similar to patents as society currently knows them.79 They would 
be used to claim ownership over certain ideas for a limited time so that the idea 
could be immune from market competition—i.e. so that the price will stay up.80 
Unitary patents will also require the disclosure of the idea in order to further the 
store of knowledge available in the public domain.81 What ultimately makes the 
unitary patent different is its implementation and its range: a unitary patent would 
operate in a European-wide system.82 
Because the European Patent Office does not have the authority itself to bind 
members of the European Union to a new system of patent laws, an EU unitary 
patent can only arise with a new international agreement created between the 
Member States of the European Union.83 Currently, twenty-five countries are 
working together to create the unitary patent.84 The envisioned agreement will be 
open only to EU nations, and will require them to accept the European Union’s 
primacy on matters under the agreement.85 The system will allow inventors to 
seek a new type of patent—the unitary patent—directly from the European Patent 
Office.86 The unitary patent will give unitary effect to an invention’s patent over 
 
77. Stallman, supra note 5. 
78. Id. 
79. See Unitary Patent / EU Patent, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legislative-
initiatives/eu-patent.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (explaining that a unitary patent would simply be an 
“optional adjunct to traditional national and European patents[,]…a European patent granted by the [European 
Patent Office] under the [European Patent Convention] to which unitary effect would be given after grant, at the 
patentee’s request.”). 
80. See LANDERS, supra note 6 (explaining the basic function of a patent). It should be noted that this 
book approaches patent from an American perspective; however, the basic functions of the patent overlap 
across international lines, and the United States patent system originates from the United Kingdom’s patent 
system. A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States, LADAS & PARRY LLP, www.ladas.com/ 
Patents/USPatentHistory.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
81. See New, supra note 9. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Unitary Patent / EU Patent, supra note 79. 
86. Id. 
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all other nation members to the agreement.87 This means that, instead of a patent 
holder having several patents under several different nations’ patent law systems, 
the holder will have a single patent under a single, European Patent Convention-
wide system of rules.88 
The agreement would also establish an international organization called the 
Unified Patent Court.89 The Unified Patent Court would contain would be split 
between three courts: a main seat in Munich, and two specialized seats in Munich 
(mechanical engineering) and London (life sciences and pharmaceuticals)90 When 
disputes arise regarding a unitary patent granted by the European Patent Office, 
the court will be the central organization for interpretation and resolution of 
disputes and their underlying legal issue.91 The court’s interpretation of the law 
would have a binding effect on all member nations.92 
B.  The Impetus for the Unitary Patent 
Supporters behind the unitary patent have a simple goal: simplicity.93 Under 
the current system, a patentee who applies to the European Patent Office is 
applying for several different patents, and this multiplies their transaction costs 
severely.94 The European Patent Office calculated various statistics, and recently 
reported that a European Patent that is valid in only thirteen nations can cost 
upward of €18,000 (nearly $24,000 U.S. dollars),95 with translation fees alone 
costing €10,000 (just over $13,000 U.S. dollars).96 “This has created a situation in 
 
87. See id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id.; Deal Reached: Unitary Patent Court To Have Three Homes, SCI. BUS. (Jun. 27, 2012), 
bulletin.sciencebusiness.net/news/75784/Deal-reached-Unitary-patent-court-to-have-three-homes. 
91. Kevin P. Mahne, A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: An Analysis of 
Europe’s Long Standing Attempt to Create a Supranational Patent System, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 162, 187 (2012). 
92. Id.  
93. See Commission Proposes Unitary Patent Protection in 25 Member States--Frequently Asked 
Questions, EUROPA (Apr. 13, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-240_en.htm. 
94. Id. 
95. Currency Calculator Euro, US Dollar, X-RATES, http://www.x-rates.com/calculator/?from= 
EUR&to=USD&amount=18000 (last visited Sept. 15, 2012). 
96. Press Release, Europa, Patents: Commission Opens the Way for Some Member States to Move 
Forward on Unitary Patent (Dec. 14, 2010), available at europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=IP/10/1714; but see also ROLAND BERGER MARKET RESEARCH, STUDY ON THE COST OF PATENTING 
1-2 (2004), available at www.effi.org/system/files?file=cost_anaylsis_2005_study_en.pdf. This source provides 
a report commissioned by the European Patent Office, which found that, in 2003, Euro-direct patents, which are 
valid in six countries, cost €30,530, and that Euro-PCT patents, which are valid in eight countries, cost €46,700. 
The prices include pre-filing expenditures, attorney fees, translation fees, internal processing costs, European 
Patent Office Fees, and validation fees. The report did estimate that the United States Patent costs more than the 
more recent European Patent Office publication, putting it at €10,250. Whether the difference accounts for a 
drop in prices or a difference in factors considered is unclear, because the more recent European Patent Office 
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which the cost of a European Patent is ten times greater than a U.S. patent, which 
costs on average €1,850 [about $2,500 U.S. dollars].”97 Indeed, this situation has 
led many patentees to forego protection in several nations in order to cut down on 
costs.98 
A unitary patent would, supporters argue, dramatically lower the cost of 
patenting, as a patentee would need only need one patent—and thus only need to 
prepare one application under one system of legal rules.99 This would cut 
attorney’s fees and other procedural costs, making European patents more 
accessible, and thus, arguably, will create greater incentives for companies to 
undertake research and development efforts.100 Furthermore, patentees would 
only be required to file a patent in three languages—German, English, and 
French.101 
C.  How Software (Could) Become Involved 
A unitary patent system, just like the current U.K.102 and European Patent 
Convention systems,103 does not necessarily have to involve expansive software 
protection.104 Briefly stated, the fear of activists like Stallman is that, if the United 
Kingdom and other European nations confer the power to the European Patent 
Office to make a single patent, the European Patent Office could expand the 
scope of the patent to cover software more broadly.105 If they did this, Stallman 
notes, because of the binding unitary effect, even if member nations objected to 
the new software patents, “no country will be able to escape them on its own.”106 
 
did not list the factors they considered in computing their figures. Currency Calculator, Euro, US Dollar, supra 
note 95. 
97. Press Release, Europa, supra note 96;  Currency Calculator Euro, US Dollar, supra note 95. 
98. Press Release, Europa, supra note 96. 
99. Commission Proposes Unitary Patent Protection in 25 Member States--Frequently Asked Questions, 
supra note 93. 
100. The value of the unitary patent will be further explored in Part IV.A. 
101. Deal Reached, supra note 90. 
102. Commission Proposes Unitary Patent Protection in 25 Member States--Frequently Asked 
Questions, supra note 93. 
103. Id.  
104. The Patents Act of 1977, c. 37, pt. 1, § 2 (2011) (U.K.); Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents, supra note 36, at art. 52(2); Stallman, supra note 5. 
105. See Stallman, supra note 5. 
106. Id. 
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IV. THE VALUE OF THE UNITARY SOFTWARE PATENT AND THE NEED FOR 
GREATER SOFTWARE PROTECTION: A RECOMMENDATION OF HOW THE UNITED 
KINGDOM CAN EXPAND SOFTWARE PROTECTION, AND A PROPOSAL OF WHAT 
THAT EXPANSION SHOULD INCLUDE 
The risks posed by the unitary patent to expand the scope of software 
protection by patent are indeed somewhat troubling.107 However, the unitary 
patent also offers several advantages to the software community.108 When one 
considers this in conjunction with protections in the law, which limits the ability 
for the scope of software to expand, the balance tips in favor of the unitary 
patent.109 Yet, while the unitary patents limited ability to expand software 
protection is comforting, it is also problematic when one considers the growing 
desire for greater software protection, and the potential110 for that desire to lead to 
an expansion.111 Thus, in addition to seeking a unitary patent, the United 
Kingdom should also embark on creating a new regime of laws that provide 
greater protection for software, thus quelling the need for a larger software 
patent.112 The United Kingdom can begin at the national level, then expand to the 
European Union and, ultimately, to the whole of the international community.113 
Any new system, while potentially being composed of many different software 
protection elements, should at a minimum include provisions similar to the 
United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act, except focusing solely on the 
issue of software.114 
A.  The Unitary Patent Survives Scrutiny, But Does Not Address the Needs of the 
Software Community 
1.  The Acceptability of the Unitary Software Patent 
First, it is worth noting that there are several apparent downsides for the 
United Kingdom in pursuing membership in a unitary patent system. For one, 
doing so would give up a significant amount of sovereignty that the United 
Kingdom has over its patent system; by allowing the unitary patent, U.K. courts 
will no longer have a role in interpreting the European Patent Convention, as this 
role will be relegated to the new patent courts created by the unitary patent.115 
 
107. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
112. See id. 
113. See infra Part IV.B. 
114. See infra Part IV.C.  
115. See supra Part III.A. 
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This loss in sovereignty will also make Stallman’s assertion that the scope of 
software patents will expand true; this is necessarily so because of the current 
divergence between the United Kingdom and the European Patent Office in 
interpreting the European Patent Convention Article 52.116 As the law currently 
stands, the European Patent Office takes a less strict view on the patentability of 
computer programs than does the United Kingdom.117 Whereas the United 
Kingdom interprets the European Patent Convention to apply to “real computer 
programs,”118 the European Patent Office is more concerned with computer 
programs when in the abstract form only.119 Because a unitary patent system 
would be governed by a European-wide entity, it would follow that the European 
Patent Office’s looser interpretation would win the day (the European Patent 
Office would not be directly in charge of the new court system, but it would play 
a pivotal role in connection with it, and would be the office through which 
patents were sought).120 
Yet, despite these concerns, there are tempering considerations. While 
entering the unitary patent does indeed sacrifice some of the United Kingdom’s 
sovereignty, this has been done routinely in the past with intellectual property 
treaties like the Berne Convention.121 This is precisely because the United 
Kingdom and other nations realized that, by sacrificing some of their 
sovereignty, they received what was ultimately better protection, which went 
beyond their borders.122 This tradeoff will be precisely the same with the unitary 
patent; in exchange for a loss of control over the patent system, the United 
Kingdom’s industries will gain a much broader patent right.123 
The efficiency of a single system of patent also provides many financial 
benefits in terms of reducing the cost for industries in the United Kingdom (and 
other nations) to get a patent.124 Noted Professor Ian Hargreaves, who was 
commissioned by the United Kingdom to make a recommendation on the unitary 
patent, argued in favor of it, and, citing the efficiency and economic benefits, 
declared the commission of an EU unitary patent and unified patent court 
deserving of the “highest immediate priority.”125 
 
116. See supra Part II.A; see also Case T 0154/04, Duns Licensing Assoc., 2008/02 Official Journal of 
the EPO 46, 60-63 (Nov. 15, 2006). 
117. See supra Part II.A (comparing the United Kingdom’s interpretation of Article 52(2) to the 
European Patent Office’s interpretation). Compare Aerotel v. Telco & Macrossan’s Applications, [2006] 
EWCA (Civ) 1371, with Case T, Official J. of the EPO. 
118. Aerotel, EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [31]. 
119. Id.; see also supra Part II.A. 
120. Aerotel, EWCA (Civ) 1371 at [31]; see also supra Part II.A; Unitary Patent / EU Patent, supra 
note 79. 
121. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 34. 
122. Id. 
123. See supra Part III.A-B. 
124. See id. 
125. HARGREAVES, supra note 14, at 8. 
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A notable counter argument to this is that the Unified Patent Corut is split 
into three courts, arguably making the term “unified” contradictory.126 This is not 
a matter for concern. Though separate, the courts have power to issue a single 
decision,127 thus retaining the sense of certainty so desired by patentees. 
Additionally, while the requirement of three languages does mean some 
translation fees will remain, this is ultimately minor compared to filing for every 
language, and the United Kingdom particularly benefits from the fact that one 
required language is English. Furthermore, London is the seat of one of these 
courts, and having the seat of a governmental institution has long been 
recognized as a strong strategic advantage.128 This is particularly important 
because United Kingdom Prime David Minister Cameron was able to remove the 
European Court of Justice’s potential appellate power, making the Unified Patent 
Court the ultimate source of adjudication.129 
There are also several legal substantive issues to consider. For one, it should 
be noted that the transition to the European Patent Office’s approach towards the 
excludability of computer programs (the issue of technical contribution) will 
likely occur, absent some change in jurisprudence, which, from the strong 
language used in Duns Licensing Associates, seems unlikely.130 Thus, the United 
Kingdom will have to swallow the Duns Licensing Associates approach should it 
want to receive the benefits of the unitary patent.131 Doing so, while perhaps not 
preferable (at least in the eyes of Lord Justice Jacob), does propose a benefit.132 
While it may be a less preferable form of law, there is value in unity; under the 
current system, U.K. industries have to deal with two distinct sets of patent law 
in regards to software—the Aerotel v. Telco and Macrossan’s Applications 
approach and the Duns Licensing Associates approach.133 This means that 
prospective patent owners will face uncertainty when drafting their claims, and 
those who do own patents will have a patent with an uncertain scope.134 This is 
 
126. Benjamin Fox, 'Historic Day' As EU Patent Deal Ends 40-Year Wait, EUOBSERVER (Dec. 12, 
2012), euobserver.com/political/118490. 
127. Id. 
128. For instance, while a more obvious capital would have been Philadelphia, the United States 
famous picked Washington D.C., a swampland, because it of its more favorable centered location between the 
North and the South, quelling southern fears of the potential Northern influence induced by a northern location. 
Washington, D.C.: History, CITY DATA, citydata.com, www.city-data.com/us-cities/The-South/Washington-D-
C-History.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).  
129. Nikolaj Nielsen, EU Breaks 30-Year Deadlock On Joint Patent, EUOBSERVER (Jun. 29, 2012), 
euobserver.com/economic/116819. Notably, the United Kingdom has further achieved the exclusion of articles 
6 and 8, a major victory increasing the incentive not to pull out of the treaty. Id. 
130. See Case T 0154/04, Duns Licensing Assoc., 2008/02 Official Journal of the EPO 46, 70 (Nov. 15, 
2006). 
131. Id.  
132. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
133. Paul England, A Clash of Appeals over Patentability, 2(11) J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 712 
(2007). 
134. See id. 
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fatal because industries that rely on patents in order to justify the research and 
development expenses required to develop a technology require legal certainty to 
ensure that their investments are worthwhile—to ensure that they will even 
pursue them in the first place.135 Thus, even if it means using a less preferable 
law, accepting the unitary patent, and the Duns Licensing Approach, will provide 
certainty to prospective and current U.K. patent owners.136 
This Comment now turns to Stallman’s suggestion that a unitary patent 
would be a back door to opening the scope of software patents.137 Stallman 
argues, “that the EPO has a vested interest in extending patents into as many 
areas of life as it can getaway with. With external limits (such as national courts) 
removed, the [European Patent Office] could impose software patents, or any 
other controversial kind of patents.”138 To this point several observations must be 
made; first among those is that, under the unitary patent system proposed, the 
European Patent Office is not empowered with judicial decision making; this 
power is, rather, invested in a unitary patent court system.139 Furthermore, while 
this court would be judicially empowered, the European Patent Convention 
would still govern the power of the court,140 and Article 52 specifically limits the 
ability for the system to expand the availability of software protection by patent, 
a significant obstacle to the supposed goals of the European Patent Office.141 
2.  The Need for Greater Software Protection 
The unitary patent is an important step for stronger software protection, but it 
is not the only step needed. As noted by Lord Justice Jacobs, there is an 
increasing demand for software protection by the business community.142 
Software protection currently comes primarily from copyright and patent law, 
two regimes which were developed long before, and thus not created for, 
 
135. Doug Litchman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 45, 59 (2007). Note the article cautions that certainty can also be a bad thing, as “some scholars suggest 
that the last marginal increase in patent certainty comes at an enormously high cost to society, in essence 
because a confident patent holder can be particularly aggressive when it comes to negotiating licensing deals or 
settling litigation.”  
136. Id.; HARGREAVES, supra note 14. Note that a further benefit is that accepting Duns Licensing 
Associates is arguably a better interpretation of the law, given that the European Patent Office Board of Appeals 
(and, ostensibly, the Unified Patent Court) has “interpretive[] supremacy with regard to the [European Patent 
Convention] in terms of its scope of application.” Case G 0003/08, C.3651.D European Patent Office 1, 13 
(May 12. 2010). Another advantage provided by having a single law is that litigation becomes less complex, 
saving companies money which they can than spend on productive activities as opposed to defensive ones.  
137. See supra Part III.C. 
138. Stallman, supra note 5.  
139. Unitary Patent / EU Patent, supra note 79. 
140. See id.  
141. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 36, at art. 52. 
142. See Aerotel v. Telco & Macrossan’s Applications, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [17] (Eng.). 
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software.143 Hence, to meet the demands of the twenty-first century, the United 
Kingdom needs to create laws that focus specifically on the “aspects [of software 
that] need some legal protection . . . that existing legal regimes cannot 
provide.”144 To bolster the credibility and strength of these laws, such a system 
should be international.145 
B.  So, How Should the United Kingdom Proceed? 
1.  Start at Home 
Since this Comment argues for an international system, it would seem logical 
for this Comment to immediately call for an international convention. It does not. 
Instead, this Comment suggests that the United Kingdom begin by instituting a 
new software regime for the United Kingdom alone. 
Any international process will be fraught with difficulty.146 But, by instituting 
a national system first, the United Kingdom will have something other nations 
cannot yet offer to software producing communities: a new form of protection.147 
By doing this, the United Kingdom can become a magnet for software 
developers, much like Ireland has become for corporations by offering them a 
low corporate tax rate.148 With this advantage, other nations will be forced to 
similarly increase their software protection in order to continue to attract 
software business to their markets.149 This will create an international need and 
 
143. See supra Part II; see generally Stallman, supra note 26. 
144. Pamela Samuelson et al, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2310 (1994). 
145. Consider the strength added to the United Kingdom’s copyright protection when the United States 
ascended to the Berne Convention. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 33-35. 
146. Consider the fact that Europe dedicated nearly a century towards trying to convince the United 
States to adopt the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. See COHEN ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 34-37. 
147. Note the one exception, and competitor to the United Kingdom, would be the United States, which 
has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the act that inspires much of the system this Comment will endorse. 
17 U.S.C. 512 (1998). To the extent that Europe has adopted laws similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, the safe harbor provision, which is keyed to system proposed by this Comment, is staggeringly weaker in 
European nations. The provisions only apply to sites that are actively aware and choose not to respond to the 
presence of improper copyright material, and lays out no guidelines or specifics on how the provision works. 
“In short, the main difference between the U.S. and the EU on matters of notice and takedown is that the EU 
removes all the formalities that exist under U.S. law and, with them, all of the protections.” Jonathan Bailey, 
U.S. vs. Europe: Notice and Takedown, PLAGIARISM TODAY (May 15, 2006), www.plagiarismtoday. 
com/2006/05/15/us-vs-europe-notice-and-takedown. Furthermore, while this Comment only recommends the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act-like provisions, it expands those provisions to an extent, and it foresees that 
any system developed by the United Kingdom will likely have many more provisions involved. 
148. See John Murray Brown, Ireland Defends Low Corporate Tax Rate, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2011, 10:26 
AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e90525f2-66a1-11e0-ac4d-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1bg8pHfAt (explaining that 
Ireland has seen great financial gain by offering a 12.5 percent tax rate to corporations). 
149. See Segolene Barbou Des Places, Evolution of Asylum Legislation in the EU: Insights from 
Regulatory Competition Theory 17 (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 2003/16, 
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desire for an agreement since, if a nation is going to increase its own protections, 
it will likely want other nations to recognize and enforce its system of laws.150 
Having already set a standard for new software protections,151 the United 
Kingdom could take charge of the debate, and set a baseline of protection that 
reflects the desires of its people, desires which already will have been expressed 
through legislative vote.152 
2.  Look Beyond Europe 
Additionally, unlike the unitary patent, which would be only available to EU 
nations,153 this Comment argues that the United Kingdom pursue the membership 
of non-European countries, particularly the United States,154 India, China, Japan, 
Brazil and Russia.155 Doing this would increase the system’s efficacy by 
providing software developers with worldwide protection; without it, software 
pirates would be able to seek refuge in other nations, and the scope of the United 
Kingdom’s new rights would be limited.156 The United Kingdom already saw this 
problem in the eighteenth and nineteenth century where, by not being a party to 
the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the 
United States frequently violated U.K. authors’ copyrights.157 International 
cooperation is thus essential.158 
 
2003), available at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/03_16.pdf (making the observation that nations 
“constantly had to readapt their legislation in order to remain competitive.”). 
150. See England, supra note 133. 
151. Fact Sheet P-01: UK Copyright Law, supra note 2. 
152. Id. 
153. See Unitary Patent / EU Patent, supra note 79. 
154. While the United States already, obviously, has many of the provisions articulated in the next 
section of this Comment, it does not have them all, and for what it does have it operates only at the national 
level. Thus, if someone violated the safe harbor based out of another country, the United States takedown notice 
would be of no use. See Michael L., How Does the Pirate Bay Respond to DMCA Takedown Notices?, IP IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE (Feb. 17, 2009), http://ipinthedigitalage.com/how-does-the-pirate-bay-respond-to-dmca-
takedown-notices (noting that attempts to serve takedown notices on the Pirate Bay, a site offering free 
copyrighted material, are fruitless, and often replied to simply with “snarky replies”). 
155. For the reasons discussed below, it is in the United Kingdom’s interest to seek the cooperation of all 
nations. However, this article singles out these non-European countries because they are either currently one of the 
larger software markets (the United States, Japan and Canada) or are emerging as one of the larger software 
markets (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Software Industry Facts and Figures, BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, 
http://www.bsa.org/country/Public/Policy/~/media/Files/Policy/Security/General/sw_factsfigures. ashx (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011). 
156. See Stallman, supra note 5 (discussing the problems that the United States faces in enforcing the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act abroad). 
157. COHEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 33-34. In fact, infringement of the United Kingdom’s authors in the 
United States was so bad that Charles Dickens undertook a tour of the United States to persuade people to honor 
his rights to his works. Id. at 33. 
158. See England, supra note 133. 
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3.  If International Cooperation Seems Unlikely, Try Enhancing It 
Of course, there could be difficulties in securing a deal with a majority of the 
world; this ranges from general logistical matters159 to the political climate of the 
prospective nations.160 If this proves to be the case, the United Kingdom would be 
wise to first pursue an EU-only agreement. Such an agreement would likely 
prove to be an easier undertaking given the close relationship that European 
nations have (by virtue of being members of the European Union).161 
To top it off, the United Kingdom does not even need all EU nations to start 
the treaty process, because the United Kingdom could proceed through the 
European Union’s provision for enhanced cooperation.162 While binding all EU 
nations to a new treaty requires each nation’s individual consent,163 the provision 
of enhanced cooperation would allow a smaller group of European nations—at 
least nine—to enter into a treaty together.164 Thus, the United Kingdom only 
needs to seek the cooperation of eight other nations to begin this process,165 and 
could rely on the utility and popularity of the new system to then attract the rest 
of the EU member nations. This theory underlies the earlier attempted use of 
enhanced cooperation for the unitary patent itself; it would work because, as put 
by Keith Hodkinson, who is the Chairman of Marks & Clerk International Law 
Firm, “[i]f the scheme were to take off we think that a number of countries now 
waiting in the wings would jump in afterwards and there would be immense 
pressure on the remaining countries to participate.”166 Hodkinson went on to 
reason that “we don’t want another decade-long wait for the European patent as 
we have had with the London Agreement on translations, so this may be a way of 
 
159. COHEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 34-37 (explaining that it took eight years to negotiate the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). 
160. See Stallman, supra note 5 (noting the large opposition movement that derailed Europe’s attempted 
expansion of software rights in 2005); see also Stallman, supra note 26 (providing, in 2005, a passionate 
argument against the software patent proposals). 
161. See Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (noting that there “is a unique economic and political 
partnership between 27 European countries” who are member to the European Union). 
162. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. CCCXXVI-CCXXXIV, Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 3, 2010 O.J. (C 83/188-192).  
163. Procedure for the Adoption of International Agreements, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_ 
summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l14532_en.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
164. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 157, at arts. CCCXXVI-
CCXXXIV; Enhanced Cooperation, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/enhanced 
_cooperation_en.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
165. See The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 157, at arts. CCCXXVI-
CCXXXIV. 
166. EU Commission Formally Proposes Single EU Patent, MARKS&CLERK UK (Dec. 16, 2010), 
www.marks-clerk.com/uk/attorneys/news/newsitem.aspx?item=360. 
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kick starting the whole process in the face of inward looking resistance from a 
few countries.”167 
C.  Creating New Online Anti-Piracy Tools: Implementing a Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act-Like System 
While an international agreement could contain many things, this Comment 
specifically proposes a tool that is modeled in part after the United States’ Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act. This will serve both to incentivize other nations to 
join the system and will work to curb the pirated software market.168 To 
incentivize others to appreciate the value of this new system, these online tools 
recognize and respond to the most significant marketplaces for pirated 
software—internet sites169 and peer-to-peer networks.170 Attacking software piracy 
on the internet is tantamount to the success of any effort to curb software piracy, 
because “[w]here Internet navigation once required knowledge of Unix or DOS 
commands, the World Wide Web has delivered point-and-click maneuverability. 
Where it once took abundant time and patience to upload and download pirated 
software programs, high-speed Internet connections and advances in compression 
technology make some of the largest files available in a matter of minutes.”171 
Focusing on Internet sites is not enough however; peer-to-peer networks 
must also be targeted.172 These networks are significant contributors to software 
piracy in part because of how they make achieving piracy easier; “where finding 
particular programs once presented a challenge, peer-to-peer (P2P) programs 
 
167. Id. Indeed, this seems to have proven true as there are now twenty-five nations, all but two of the 
EU, who are working to join the unitary patent system (at the time of enhanced cooperation, there were only 
12). New, supra note 9. 
168. See supra Part IV.B. 
169. This term, as it will be used, is to be construed broadly, and includes auction sites, one-click 
hosting sites and bit-torrent sites, which are significant sources for pirated software; more generally, it covers 
the traditional categories protected under the United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which includes: 
conduit communications (which “include the transmission and routing of information, such as email or Internet 
Service Provider, which store the material only temporarily on their networks”), system caching (which “refers 
to the temporary copies of data that are made by service providers in providing various services that require 
such copying in order to transfer data”), storage systems (which “refers to services which allow users to store 
information on their networks, such as a webhosting service or a chat room”) and information location tools 
(which “refer to services such as search engines, directories, or pages of recommended web sites which provide 
links to allegedly infringing web sites”). The Many Forms of Software Internet Piracy, BUS. SOFTWARE 
ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/country/~/media/Files/Antipiracy/en/formsofsoftwarepiracy.ashx (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2012); Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) about DMCA Safe Harbor, CHILLING EFFECTS, 
www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/faq (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
170. The Many Forms of Software Internet Piracy, supra note 164. Note that the United States’ Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act does not expand to peer-to-peer networks; this system will. Jennifer Urban & Laura 
Quilter, Efficient Process or ‘Chilling Effects’? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 649 (2006). 
171. Internet Software Piracy Fact Sheet, BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/~/ 
media/b60b3ae31b984b50b5b11200aa7b781f.ashx (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
172. See id.  
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have enabled easy and wide-ranging searches. Today, even the most novice of 
users can find his or her way to tens of thousands of pirated software copies.”173 
On one such network, The Pirate Bay, a web user can gain access to at least 300 
pieces of software without doing anything more than clicking the menu link for 
“applications,”—and the presence of the search engine function suggests much 
more software is bound to be found.174 
The volume of such peer-to-peer network infringements that could be 
stopped by acts like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is staggering; one 
study of Digital Millennium Copyright Act takedown requests revealed that 
nearly half of the discoveries of online pirated material were focused on material 
found on peer-to-peer networks.175 Given the ease of piracy through Internet sites 
and peer-to-peer networks, a new system that is able to directly attack these ports 
of piracy will yield direct benefits for software producers.176 It will help create an 
incentive in the software manufacturing industry to organize behind the system 
and push their countries to adopt it.177 
So, what should this Digital Millennium Copyright Act-like system include? 
For one, it should create a safe harbor provision178 for Internet sites, peer-to-peer 
networks, and Internet Service Providers from secondary liability for the 
software rights infringement.179 The safe harbor will prevent groups from 
suffering liability for infringement by others on their site or network (i.e. 
infringement the site owners did not themselves partake in; if they themselves 
 
173. Id.  
174. Browse Applications>Applications, THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.org/browse/300 (last 
visited Jan 15, 2011). Not all of this software is necessarily illegal; for example, an independent software 
producer could create a software program and make it available on the site free to anyone who wishes to 
download it. However, even a cursory overview reveals that much of the software listed are commercial titles, 
and The Pirate Bay has a well-known reputation for hosting illegal content. British Telecom urged to Block 
Illegal Filesharing Hub, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/ 
2011/nov/04/british-telecom-block-illegal-filesharing-site (noting that “[t]he Pirate Bay is the world’s largest 
BitTorrent site, enabling and encouraging the mass illegal distribution of copyrighted content”). 
175. Urban & Quilter, supra note 170 (The study was based off a list of self-reported takedown notices. 
Additionally, it is a study of all copyrighted materials, not just software). 
176. The takedown procedures directed at material on peer-to-peer sites noted in the Urban and Quilter 
article would, if this were the state of the law, be effective, and thus implicate the remaining half of the material 
that those who seek to rely on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act wish to address. Id. 
177. Because, as Lord Justice Jacob pointed out, there is a demand for increased software protection. 
Aerotel v. Telco & Macrossan’s Applications, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [17] (Eng.). 
178. To the extent that safe harbor provisions exist under current EU law, they are toothless. Bailey, 
supra note 147.  
179. While an Internet Service Provider would not likely post pirated software—it is instead in the 
business of providing access to the Internet—it is imperative to target these entities because they do in fact have 
the ability to restrict access to the Internet, and can thus be a tool in taking down repeat software pirates. 
Edward Wyatt, U.S. Court Curbs F.C.C. Authority on Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/technology/07net.html; Comcast Corp. v FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
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posted the material, they would not be a part of the safe harbor), so long as they 
comply with certain rules and procedures.180 
There should be several requirements for a site to meet in order to fall under 
safe harbor.181 First, sites, peer-to-peer networks, and Internet Service Providers 
in the safe harbor must comply with a takedown notice process.182 Here, where 
software-rights holders notify a site or a peer-to-peer network user’s Internet 
Service Provider that their site is hosting pirated software, the site, peer-to-peer 
network, or Internet Service Provider will be given a set amount of time to block 
access to material, remove the material, or, where necessary, terminate the 
internet rights of a user,183 or to provide a response to the company asserting a 
claim of legitimacy of the questioned software (i.e. argue that the software was 
legally posted).184 Where disputes are not resolved, litigation can be pursued.185 If 
a resolution in favor of the software rights holder comes down, the court can be 
empowered to allow a suit for infringement to occur if the site is deemed to have 
acted in an unreasonable manner;186 the scope of unreasonableness can be defined 
and developed by the judiciaries of the various participating nations, and thus 
evolve alongside and adapt to the system and the beliefs of a given nation on 
software protection and litigation rights.187 
A second requirement to qualify for safe harbor provisions will be a more 
general requirement that site owners, when they are specifically aware, through 
any means, that there is pirated software on the site, and they can locate it 
through reasonable means, that they will act to remove it or, for Internet Service 
Providers, to put the user on notice that they are infringing (and that repeated 
activity could lead to their Internet access being severed).188 This requirement is 
basically modeled after the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s protections in 
section 512, parts (c)(1)(A)(iii) and (d)(1)(C), and will ensure that a basic level of 
responsibility is observed among sites which host software.189 It requires specific 
awareness in order to limit the provision’s strict application to only the clearest 
 
180. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. § 512(b)(2), (c)(3), (d)(2). 
183. This portion of the response must be taken carefully because, while it is important to stop online 
piracy, there may be instances of innocent infringement, where a user did simply did not understand their rights, 
or where the user believed they had the right to post software (such as believing the software was open source, 
or within the fair use doctrine). To this end, the law can set up guidelines or empower nations to set up 
guidelines on what must be necessary for an Internet Service Provider to blacklist a user. 
184. 17 U.S.C. § 512. These procedural requirements are essential to enabling the proper enforcement of 
the law. Bailey, supra note 147. 
185. For an example of such litigation, see Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
186. See Internet Software Piracy Fact Sheet, supra note 166; see also Bailey, supra note 147. 
187. Internet Software Piracy Fact Sheet, supra note 166; Bailey, supra note 147. 
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A), (d)(1). 
189. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii), (d)(1)(C). 
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violations.190 For issues regarding a general awareness that software infringement 
is occurring, we turn to requirement three: policing. 
The third requirement to qualify for safe harbor protections will be for 
Internet sites and peer-to-peer networks which host software to take on an 
affirmative self-policing duty.191 This duty will be, and must be, somewhat 
limited, because of the danger that financial costs of policing obligations can 
pose to an Internet venture.192 For example, consider the costs of a site like 
YouTube to fully police itself for videos which infringed on copyrights, as was 
argued by Viacom in Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube Inc.193 If Viacom is 
successful, YouTube will be responsible for finding “a small fraction [of works 
amongst] millions of works posted by others on the service’s platform.”194 The 
costs to sort through all these works, or develop the necessary technology, and 
determine whether they are actually infringing or whether they are protected 
through some other means, like fair use, would be staggering.195 While some large 
companies might be able to afford the investment it required, many smaller 
Internet ventures, unable to qualify for safe harbor, would crumble from the 
ensuing litigation, as, even if they succeed in avoiding an infringement verdict, 
the cost of the defense could itself be fatal. YouTube’s trial defense in Viacom 
Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc. cost the company a hundred million dollars—before 
even going to trial—and their favorable verdict has been remanded, meaning 
even more costs are to come.196 Indeed, some ventures would be forced out 
simply from fear of litigation, and those who were not may still find themselves 
unable to justify growth given the potential liability risks in hosting larger 
amounts of materials.197 
Yet, an affirmative duty can be created for the purposes of software, as long 
as it is properly limited. For one, by focusing only on software, there would be a 
 
190. Not all software accused of infringement will be actual infringement. For example, issues may arise 
where an otherwise copyrighted software is being used in a way pursuant to the fair use doctrine. Copyright 
Law Fact Sheet P-09: Understanding Fair Use, THE UK COPYRIGHT SERV. (July 5, 2004), 
http://www.copyrightservice.co.uk/copyright/p09_fair_use. 
191. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).; see Frequently 
Asked Questions (and Answers) about DMCA Safe Harbor, supra note 169. 
192. See Wyatt, supra note 179; see also Viacom Int’l Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d at 523-24. 
193. Viacom Int’l Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d at 524. YouTube was initially successful in earning a summary 
judgment motion; however, the case has been remanded on several factual issues, though much of the legal 
analysis was upheld. See generally Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
194. Viacom Int’l Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d at 524. 
195. See id. at 523.  
196. Id. at 524; Viacom Int’l Inc., 676 F.3d at 19; Eric Schonfeld, Google Spent $100 Million Defending 
Against Viacom’s $1 Billion Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (July 15, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/ 2010/07/15/google-
viacom-100-million-lawsuit/. 
197. See Stephen DeMaura, ‘Loser Pays,’ Texas Small Business Wins, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 31, 
2011, 10:09 AM), www.nationalreview.com/corner/268436/loser-pays-texas-small-business-wins-stephen-
demaura (exploring the issue of business tort liability, and noting that it has strangled some small businesses out 
of existence). 
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smaller group of Internet ventures that are affected by these new rules, 
decreasing the fears of slowing the natural progression of the Internet.198 Second, 
what constitutes policing can be narrowed to workable means; for instance, 
instead of requiring sites which host software to police all content, a system 
could be required in which a site instead engages in policing by sampling—
randomly taking five to ten percent of the software uploaded on its site per year 
and screening it for piracy concerns.199 This would be a more manageable task 
that smaller ventures could take on and should the task be onerous, exemptions 
and waivers could be made available upon a showing of hardship.200 When 
instigated, policing by sampling, though minimal, will nonetheless have an 
important effect: it will put those who host pirated software at threat of detection, 
detection which could lead to civil or criminal liability (the system could 
facilitate this by requiring that sites provide, so long as it can be done in a 
reasonable and non-burdensome manner, notice to software rights holders that 
their material is being infringed upon).201 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the two largest pillars of intellectual property, patent and copyright, 
were established long before the emergence of software, software has 
nevertheless come to be a central intellectual property issue and need.202 So far, 
protection for this new field has, by and large, been developed by working within 
these traditional pillars.203 As the march into the twenty-first century continues, it 
will become increasingly apparent that relying on doctrines developed centuries 
ago to protect a technology that developed within the last half of the twentieth 
century is no longer sufficient.204 Countries will likely explore new means of 
 
198. The United States’ Digital Millennium Act applies to all forms of copyright. See generally 17 
U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
199. Think of this much like you would think about a drug checkpoint; not every car would be stopped, 
but a pre-established amount of cars would be, and all cars would be at risk—and thus have less incentive—to 
carry drugs. With all uploaded software being at risk for monitoring, a similar effect on incentives would take 
place. See generally MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE POLICE: CASES, 
STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 104-07 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining automobile checkpoints and officers 
given in the field discretion to select vehicles to stop). 
200. See e.g. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. Saf-C 3222.08 (New Hampshire statute detailing economic hardship 
waiver possible if other criteria are met in vehicle inspection). 
201. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (creating such liability). Of course, some will find ways to 
circumvent this proposed system. No system can account fully for human interference. To the extent that it 
cannot, however, the system will still be useful in attacking piracy to the extent that it creates a new regulating 
presence on the Internet. 
202. See What is Intellectual Property?, supra note 1 (defining the several intellectual property 
regimes). 
203. See supra Part II. 
204. This Comment is hardly the first to call for a greater, more specific focus on developing software 
only laws. For example, see Samuelson et al., supra note 144 (containing an entire symposium and journal issue 
focused solely on the development of an intellectual property system for software). 
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software protection with increasing speed—in fact, some countries already have 
begun to do just that.205 
Software protection would be well served by the adoption of the unitary 
patent and by the creation of new anti-piracy tools.206 Doing either or both of 
these things would mark a greater presence of international cooperation, and (or 
at least) a more cohesive European Union, and would be an important step 
towards creating a software regime that is compatible with the needs of the 
industry and its users.207 
 
205. Consider the European Union’s software directive, for example. See generally Directive 
2009/24/EC, supra note 62 (working through the auspices of copyright law, the directive is entirely focused on 
software issues). 
206. See supra Part IV.A, C. 
207. Greater cooperation and mutual reliance by countries lead to greater stability and mutual reliance. 
This is precisely why Europe fought so hard for the United States to join treaties like the Berne Convention—
having equal laws meant greater protection for both countries’ people. COHEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 34-37. 
This basic theory is perhaps best espoused by a line from the venerable political drama The West Wing, which 
commented on what the cooperation and mutual reliance instilled by free trade does for the world: “free trade 
stops wars.” The West Wing: Somebody’s Going to Emergency, Somebody’s Going to Jail, NBC (Feb. 28, 
2001), http://westwing.bewarne.com/second/38somebody.html (containing a description of the episode as well 
as the quote in question). When countries’ economies rely on each other, there is an incentive to engage in 
mutually beneficial action. 
